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I. INTRODUCTION: THE COMMON SENSE OF RICO
When Congress passed the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO"),' in 1970, most lawmakers probably be-
lieved that it was one of the rare pieces of legislation that offered
huge political rewards without much chance of any political fallout.
After all, who could oppose the curtailment of organized crime?
Thus, the language of section 1962(c), which would become the
most frequently relied upon provision in both criminal and civil
RICO prosecutions, was wildly broad:
t Shareholder, Leonard, Street and Deinard, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota;
J.D., magna cum laude, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1994).
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It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associ-
ated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct
or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
actiity....
Admittedly, RICO was convoluted, but innocuous. The "per-
son" referred to in the statute was obviously someone involved in
organized crime: a hit man, a money launderer, the head of a
crime family. However, these people were not likely to receive pay
checks or to be "employed" by the crime family in any traditional
sense, so Congress expanded application of the statute to persons
who were simply "associated" with the crime family. Application of
the more formal term "enterprise," as opposed to "crime family,"
simply closed the legal loophole that would enable a creative
criminal defense attorney to argue that his client could not be
prosecuted under RICO because he was not related by blood or
ethnicity to other members of the criminal syndicate. A RICO "en-
terprise" included any group of people that came together to or-
chestrate a criminal scheme. Moreover, Congress did not limit
RICO to natural persons, but also made it applicable to legal per-
sons, such as legitimate corporations, that were used to launder the
funds of the criminal enterprise.3 The limitation on RICO was that
it did not prohibit legitimate business or social activity; it applied
only when people were involved in "racketeering activity," which
was expressly limited to a few very serious crimes such as: murder,
kidnapping, illegal gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion,
narcotic trade, counterfeiting, embezzlement, slave traffic, mail
fraud, and wire fraud, to name but a few.4 Finally, under section
1962(c), a person had to commit these crimes repeatedly. For ex-
ample, the person had to engage in a "pattern" of murder or kid-
napping or illegal gambling or arson, and so on, before they could
be charged with violating RICO. 5 On its face, this was a good law. It
ensured that the worst of society, and anyone who knowingly ad-
vanced their cause, would pay for their crimes.
Unlike traditional criminal legislation, RICO also went one
step further. It not only ensured that criminals would serve jail
2. Id. § 1962(c).
3. See id. § 1961(3).
4. See id. § 1961(1).
5. See id. § 1962(c).
1090 [Vol. 24
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time for their illicit acts but also enabled anyone "injured in his
business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962...
[to] recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. " Thus, Congress not
only gave the Department of Justice the authority to fight against
these bad actors but gave every decent, honest, hard-working per-
son injured "by reason of" organized criminal activity the right to
don the mantle of a private attorney general.
This is essentially the common sense behind RICO, and during
its initial years, RICO worked as intended. Between 1970 and 1979,
there are less than 50 reported federal district court cases concern-
ing RICO.7 Almost all of the reported cases deal with circum-
stances that could have been reasonably anticipated by Congress:
fraudulent schemes whereby the defendants secured government
8funding by filing false reports; non-union companies bribing un-
ion officials to obtain union work;9 the theft of securities and their
interstate transportation; 0 and the bribery of government officials
by defendants in order to evade enforcement of state regulations or
to obtain government benefits."
Then, without warning, RICO litigation exploded in the early
1980s. Between 1980 and 1985, there were approximately 266 re-
ported federal district court RICO cases;" roughly 77 of which were
civil RICO cases.13 Between 1986 and 1990, approximately 789 fed-'4
eral district court RICO cases were reported, over 100 of which
were civil RICO cases. 15 Between 1991 and 1995, there were ap-16
proximately 525 reported federal district court RICO cases, almost
6. Id. § 1964(c) (emphasis added).
7. This information was obtained by running the following query on West-
law's DCT database: DA(After 1969 & Before 1980) & HE(1964(c)).
8. See United States v. Munoz, 392 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. Mich. 1974), affd, 529
F.2d 526 (6th Cir. 1975).
9. See United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
10. SeeUnited States v. Amato, 367 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
11. See United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976); United
States v. Frumento, 405 F. Supp. 23 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
12. This information was obtained by running the following query on West-
law's DCT database: DA(After 1979 & Before 1986) & 319HK!.
13. This information was obtained by running the following query on West-
law's DCT database: DA(After 1979 & Before 1986) & 319HK! /p 1964(c).
14. This information was obtained by running the following query on West-
law's DCT database: DA(After 1985 & Before 1991) & 319HK!.
15. This information was obtained by running the following query on West-
law's DCT database: DA(After 1985 & Before 1991) & 319HK! /p 1964(c).
16. This information was obtained by running the following query on West-
19981
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100 of which remained civil RICO cases.17
More recently, RICO has become an increasingly common
claim in product-related litigation. This strange phenomenon is
only one natural outgrowth of the many non-traditional uses that
creative plaintiffs' lawyers have found for RICO.' The RICO "per-
son" is no longer the hit man, but the corporate entity that manu-
factures a product. The "enterprise" is not the crime family but the
network of retailers and dealers that sell the manufacturer's prod-
uct.19 The manufacturer is "associated" with the network of retail-
ers or dealers by virtue of the dealership and/or agency contracts
that give the manufacturer a degree of control over the re-20
tailer/dealer's prices, advertising, inventory, and so on. The
predicate activity engaged in by the manufacturer is mail and wire
fraud, or allegedly fraudulent product advertisements that are dis-
tributed through the mail or over the radio and television."
To convert a product liability claim into a RICO claim, a plain-
tiff usually needs only one arguably fraudulent phrase that is re-
peated in product advertising. Finding this arguably fraudulent
phrase is frequently an easy thing to do. How many products are
perfect? When a manufacturer's engineers issue reports suggesting
product improvements or alterations that will resolve product
glitches, suddenly the manufacturer is on notice that the product
may have deficiencies. Not many manufacturers, however, will in-
form consumers of every deficiency related to a product. If the de-
ficiency is relatively minor, the problem may be left uncorrected.
Thereafter, if a product fails as a result of an arguably known but
undisclosed or uncorrected deficiency, the consumer can allege
that the advertisements were fraudulent. RICO claims based on
this type of factual scenario have repeatedly presented themselves
law's DCT database: DA(After 1990 & Before 1996) & 319HK!.
17. This information was obtained by running the following query on West-
law's DCT database: DA(After 1990 & Before 1996) & 319HK! /p 1964(c).
18. See infra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
19. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1994) (defining enterprise as "includ[ing] any
individual, partnership, corporation, association or other legal entity, and any un-
ion or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."). See gen-
erally Alexander M. Parker, Note, Stretching RICO to The Limit and Beyond, 45 DuKE
L.J. 819, 836-39 (1996) (giving a broad overview of the enterprise requirement).
20. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1994) (making it unlawful for any person em-
ployed by or associated with an enterprise to engage in a pattern of racketeering
activity through the enterprise).
21. See id. § 1961(1) (listing specifically mail and wire fraud as predicate acts
upon which a RICO violation can be founded).
[Vol. 241092
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in the mass tort arena. Some of the most publicized product liabil-
ity actions have sought recovery under RICO, including those
claims brought against cigarette manufacturers;" the asbestos in-
21 24dustry; medical device and drug companies; product suppliers
on nuclear power plant construction projects;
25 and others.2 6
The objective of this article is to explain the reasons for the in-
22. See Ehrich v. B.A.T. Indus., P.L.C., 964 F. Supp. 164 (D.N.J. 1997); City
and County of San Francisco v. Philip Morris, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1130 (N.D. Cal.
1997); Allman v. Philip Morris, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Cal. 1994); Laborers
Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., No. 97 Civ. 4550 (SAS), 1998
WL 146217, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. March 26, 1998).
23. See Fried v. Sungard Recovery Serv., Inc., 900 F. Supp. 758 (E.D. Pa.
1995); Prudential Ins. Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 828 F. Supp. 287 (D.N.J.
1993).
24. See Raye v. Medtronic Corp., 696 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Minn. 1988) (deciding
claim related to a defective pacemaker); Savastano v. Thompson Med. Co., 640 F.
Supp. 1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (deciding claim brought against manufacturer on an
appetite suppressant); Moore v. Eli Lilly & Co., 626 F. Supp. 365, 365 (D. Mass.
1986) (Oraflex litigation); Campbell v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 615 F. Supp. 496,
496 (W.D. Wisc. 1985) (Dalkon Shield litigation).
25. See South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 826 F.
Supp. 1549 (D.S.C. 1993) (involving claims arising out of the allegedly defective
nuclear steam supply systems provided to nuclear power plants in South Carolina);
Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 656 F. Supp. 49 (S.D. Ohio 1986)
(involving claims arising out of the allegedly defective nuclear steam supply sys-
tems provided to the William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station in Moscow,
Ohio); Long Island Lighting Co. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 1442,
reh'g denied, 648 F. Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (involving claims arising out of the
supply of defective emergency diesel generators to a nuclear power plant in
Shoreham, New York).
26. Several other product liability cases which pursued RICO actions involved
claims arising out of a farm storage product that allegedly caused harm to animals
that ate the tainted food. See Martin v. A.O. Smith Corp., 931 F. Supp. 543 (W.D.
Mich. 1996); Valleyside Dairy Farms, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 944 F. Supp. 612
(W.D. Mich. 1995); Wight v. Agristor Leasing, 652 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Kan. 1987);
Agristor Leasing v. A.O. Smith Corp., 634 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Kan. 1986). Another
type of product liability action that sought recovery under RICO involved a claim
arising out of a defective can opener that caused a fire destroying plaintiff's home.
See Averbach v. Rival Mfg. Co., 809 F. 2d 1016 (3d Cir. 1987). A third type of
product liability case that sought to make use of RICO involved a claim arising out
of a live microorganism that lacked the potency to treat waste water as repre-
sented. See General Envtl. Science Corp. v. Horsfall, 800 F. Supp. 1497, 1497 (N.D.
Ohio 1992), affid in part, vacated in part, 25 F.3d 1048, 1048 (6th Cir. 1994). Three
other product liability actions which involved brick bond and mortar that allegedly
caused corrosion of metals also pursued RICO claims. See In re Dow Co. "Sarabond"
Prod. Liability Litig., 666 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Colo. 1987); Moravian Dev. Corp. v.
Dow Chem. Co., 651 F. Supp. 144 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Behunin v. Dow Chem. Co.,
650 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Colo. 1986). Finally, a claim arising out of an allegedly
fraudulent product warranty also pursued a RICO claim. See Fitzgerald v. Chrysler
Corp., 116 F.3d 225 (7th Cir. 1997).
10931998l
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creasing use of civil RICO in product litigation and ways in which
manufacturers can avoid the treble liability imposed by the statute.
Part II describes the culprits or the characteristics of RICO's statu-
tory language and legislative history that led to its expansive use.
Part III discusses early theories aimed at limiting RICO's reach and
the United States Supreme Court's rejection of those theories. Part
IV discusses legal arguments that are currently sanctioned by the
Supreme Court, or that have not been rejected, and that may en-
able a manufacturer to shed a RICO claim appended to a common
product liability action.
II. THE CULPRITS
The use of civil RICO in product-related litigation can be
blamed primarily on three factors: (1) legislative history extolling
Congress' broad and sweeping intentions when it passed RICO; (2)
section 1961 (1), which defines racketeering activity as, inter alia,
mail fraud 27 and wire fraud;28 and (3) section 1964(c), which allows
for the recovery of treble damages.
A. Legislative History
Much of RICO's unanticipated growth can be blamed on its
well-intentioned but short-sighted legislative history. At the time of
its passage, Congress no doubt envisioned RICO as a powerful tool
against organized crime-not as another boilerplate count in a
product liability lawsuit. RICO was an effort by Congress to fight
fire with fire-big legislation to combat a big problem. As a result,
RICO's legislative record is filled with passages expressing Con-
gress' wide-reaching intentions.
Perhaps the most cited provision in RICO's legislative record is
the admonition that RICO be "liberally construed to effectuate its
remedial purposes."'29 Although this was the most succinct expres-
27. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
28. See id. § 1343.
29. See Reves v. Ernst &Young, 507 U.S. 170, 183 (1993); Holmes v. Securities
Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 274 (1992); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,
473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985); United States v. Rogers, 89 F.3d 1326, 1337 (7th Cir.
1996); United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 708 F. Supp. 1388, 1395 (S.D.N.Y.
1989); Shared Network Technologies Inc. v. Taylor, 669 F. Supp. 422, 426 (N.D.
Ga. 1987); Ora Corp. v. Vinson, 596 F. Supp. 1546, 1547 (D.S.C. 1984); Summers
v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 592 F. Supp. 1240, 1243 (W.D. Okla. 1984); Engl v.
Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146, 1155 (E.D. Pa. 1981); United States v. Frumento, 405 F.
1094 [Vol. 24
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sion of Congress' broad intentions, there are many other passages
of legislative history that have aided RICO's expansion. As noted in
Glusband v. Benjamin:
30
This court's examination of the legislative history behind
RICO reveals no evidence of an intent to limit the scope
of the civil remedy enacted .... The House Report on
the bill later enacted into law as the RICO statute stated
only the following with respected to the [civil remedy pro-
vision]:
Section 1964 provides civil remedies for the violation
of 1962 above....
Subsection (c) provides for the recovery of treble
damages by any person injured in his business or
property by reason of the violation of section 1962.
H.R.Rep.No. 91-1549, 91st Cong. 2nd Sess., reprinted in
[1970] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4007, 4034.
The language in the House Report does not evince a
"clearly expressed legislative intent" to restrict civil liabil-
ity.... Thus, the court is constrained to give the statutory
provision at issue the broad scope indicated by the lan-
guage of the Act. s'
Other courts have justified broad interpretations of RICO on
the basis of its stated purpose to provide "enhanced sanctions and
new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged
in organized crime."3 2 Still other courts have referred to passages
indicating that RICO was designed to fight the "corruption of 'the
process of our democratic society"' when rationalizing RICO's use
against public institutions, rather than private companies.33 The
Supp. 23, 29 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
30. 530 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
31. Id. at241.
32. United States v. Castro, 89 F.3d 1443, 1458 n.2 (11th Cir. 1996); see also
United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185, 1197 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Crosby, 20 F.3d 480, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842,
864 (8th Cir. 1987); Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 717 (2d Cir. 1987); United
States v. McClendon, 712 F. Supp. 723, 729 (E.D. Ark. 1988); Banco de Desarrollo
Agropecuario, S.A. v. Gibbs, 640 F. Supp. 1168, 1171 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Pares v.
Heinhold Commodities, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645, 646 (N.D. Ill. 1980); MHC, Inc. v.
Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am., 685 F. Supp. 1370, 1377 n.2 (E.D. Ky.
1988); United States v. Bananno Org. Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra, 683 F.
Supp. 1411, 1421 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), affd, 879 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1989).
33. United States v. Frumento, 405 F. Supp. 23, 30 (E.D. Pa. 1975); see also
United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1022, op. supplemented, 415 F. Supp.
1998] 1095
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United States Supreme Court, however, provided the most concise
description of section 1964(c)'s, or civil RICO's, legislative history
in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.:1
4
RICO was an aggressive initiative to supplement old
remedies and develop new methods for fighting crime.
While few of the legislative statements about novel reme-
dies and attacking crime on all fronts... were made with
direct reference to § 1964(c), it is in this spirit that all of
the Act's provisions should be read. The specific refer-
ences to § 1964(c) are consistent with this overall ap-
proach. Those supporting § 1964(c) hoped it would "en-
hance the effectiveness of [RICO's] prohibitions," and
provide "a major tool." Its opponents, also recognizing
the provision's scope, complained that it provided too
easy a weapon against "innocent businessmen," and would
be prone to abuse. It is also significant that a previous
proposal to add RICO-like provisions to the Sherman Act
had come to grief in part precisely because it "could cre-
ate inappropriate and unnecessary obstacles in the way
of... a private litigant [who] would have to contend with
a body of precedent-appropriate purely in antitrust con-
text-setting strict requirements on questions such as
,standing to sue' and 'proximate cause.'
[In passing RICO,] Congress wanted to reach both
"legitimate" and "illegitimate" enterprises. The former en-
joy neither an inherent incapacity for criminal activity nor
immunity from its consequences. The fact that § 1964(c)
is used against respected businesses allegedly engaged in a
pattern of specifically identified criminal conduct is hardly
a sufficient reason for assuming that the provision is being
misconstrued. Nor does it reveal the "ambiguity" discov-
ered by the court below. "[T] he fact that RICO has been
applied in situations not anticipated by Congress does not
demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth.
3 5
Accordingly, Congress clearly intended that RICO would be an
aggressive tool in the fight against organized crime and repeatedly
and unconditionally stated that intention. Congress did not real-
ize, however, that the "specifically identified criminal conduct" was
not so "specifically identified." The inclusion of mail and wire
1025 (D. Md. 1976).
34. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
35. Id. at 498-99 (citations omitted).
1096 [Vol. 24
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fraud as predicate acts meant that almost any case of common law
fraud could give rise to a RICO claim.
B. Mail and Wire Fraud Predicate Acts
The federal mail and wire fraud statutes are specifically listed
among the crimes upon which a RICO violation can be predi-
cated. The mail and wire fraud statutes state, respectively:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, repre-
sentations, or promises.., for the purpose of executing
such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in
any post office or authorized depository for mail matter,
any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by
the Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited
any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by
any private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or
receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or know-
ingly causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier accord-
ing to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is
directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is ad-
dressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.37
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, repre-
sentations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmit-
ted by means of wire, radio, or television communication
in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, sig-
nals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing
such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or
38imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
The mail and wire fraud statutes are exceptionally broad. Ini-
tially, it was believed that the mail and wire fraud statutes could be
applied only to the person who actually placed the mail in the mail
box or dialed the telephone to make a fraudulent call. Very early
on, however, in Pereira v. United States,9 the United States Supreme
Court rejected such a limitation, holding that the federal mail and
36. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1994).
37. Id. § 1341.
38. Id. § 1343.
39. 347 U.S. 1 (1953)
19981 1097
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wire fraud statutes applied to anyone who could reasonably foresee
the use of the mails or wires to advance a scheme: "[w] here one
does an act with knowledge that the use of the mails [or wires] will
follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such use can
reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually intended, then he
'causes' the mails [or wires] to be used., 4' A mail or wire fraud
conviction can even be based on communications sent by a victim
of the plot or an innocent third party, so long as these communica-
tions were foreseeable by the defendant.41 This ruling gave prose-
cutors the ability to use the mail and wire fraud statutes against not
only the particular individual who placed the fraudulent letter in
the mail box or who dialed the phone, but also against the leader
of the crime family who planned the scheme, and eventually,
against the corporate president who sanctioned an arguably
fraudulent advertising campaign.
In Pereira, the Supreme Court also determined that the use of
the mails need not be essential to the success of the fraudulent
scheme. A conviction could result even though the defendant's use
of the mails or wires was incidental.4 ' Thus, according to Pereira, a
con artist who induced a woman to marry him and who absconded
with checks that were mailed to the woman by her investment firm
could be convicted of mail fraud, even though the con-artist's plan
could have succeeded regardless of whether the checks were deliv-
ered by mail or carrier pigeon. Likewise, an allegedly unscrupulous
manufacturer who sells products exclusively door-to-door could be
40. Id. at 8-9.
41. See, e.g., Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710-11 (1989) (mailing
element supplied by victimized used-car retailers submitting title applications to
state motor vehicles bureau); United States v. Pepper, 51 F.3d 469, 472 (5th Cir.
1995) (mailing element satisfied by defrauded investors' mailing of money to de-
fendant); United States v. Blackmon, 839 F.2d 900, 908 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating de-
fendant could foresee that victim's investment firm would issue wire transfer in-
structions in order to transfer funds from victim's to defendant's accounts);
United States v. Toney, 598 F.2d 1349, 1352-53 (5th Cir. 1979) (asserting that let-
ters from victim's counsel were foreseeable where defendant attempted to lull vic-
tim into refraining from investigating the scheme); Durham v. Independence
Bank of Chicago, 629 F. Supp. 983, 988 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (finding that defendant
could foresee that plaintiff would continue to mail business plans in response to
the defendant's false representations that it was continuing to process the plain-
tiffs loan application).
42. See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954); see also United States v.
Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 723 n.6 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239,
1244 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Hubbard, 16 F.3d 694, 702 (6th Cir. 1994),
rev'd in part, 514 U.S. 695 (1995).
1098 [Vol. 24
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found guilty of mail fraud if customers paid for the product by
mailing checks, even though the particular method of delivery is
immaterial to the manufacturer.
One would also think that to be guilty of mail or wire fraud the
defendant would actually have to defraud another person, but this
is not so. A violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes depends
only upon the existence of a "scheme to defraud" regardless of
43whether that scheme ever results in harm to anyone. Whether a
mail or wire fraud scheme is successful is immaterial; the govern-
ment need only show that some actual harm or injury was contem-
plated by the defendant." Thus, a particularly inept con-artist
could be convicted of mail fraud even if no one responded to his
mailed solicitations that fraudulently promised a free vacation if
the recipient simply forwarded to him their credit card numbers.
Likewise, an unscrupulous manufacturer could arguably be guilty
of mail fraud even if no one purchased any of the fraudulently ad-
vertised products.
Although the mail fraud statute is a federal law, a violation of
the statutes can be based on purely intrastate mailings. Courts have
rationalized that because the jurisdiction under the mail fraud
statute is based on the federal government's postal power, con-
ferred by Article I, Section 8, Clause 7 of the Constitution, and be-
cause the federal government's postal power includes authority to
deliver purely intrastate mail, the mail fraud statute extends to
purely intrastate communications.5 The wire fraud statute, how-
ever, is not so broad and requires that the wire communications
occur between residents of different states.4
Finally, like common law fraud actions, mail or wire fraud
need not be based on direct evidence of the defendant's intent to
43. See United States v. Blumeyer, 114 F.3d 758, 767 n.6 (8th Cir. 1997).
44. See United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1390 (l1th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 441 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Jordan, 112 F.3d
14, 19 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 350 (1997); United States v. Rude, 88
F.3d 1538, 1547 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Dinome, 86 F.3d 277, 283 (2d
Cir. 1996); United States v. Ames Sintering Co., 927 F.2d 232, 235 (6th Cir. 1990).
45. See United States v. Elliott, 89 F.3d 1360, 1363-64 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. de-
nied, 118 S. Ct. 318 (1997).
46. See, e.g., Smith v. Ayres, 845 F.2d 1360, 1366 (5th Cir. 1988); Bernstein v.
Misk, 948 F. Supp. 228, 238 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Brooke v. Schlesinger, 898 F. Supp.
1076, 1082 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[i]n contrast to mail fraud, '[w]ire fraud requires the
additional element of a communication across state lines.'"); Arenson v. Whitehall
Convalescent & Nursing Home, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 1202, 1212-13 (N.D. Ill. 1995);
Metro Furniture Rental, Inc. v. Alessi, 770 F. Supp. 198, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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defraud. Under the mail and wire fraud statutes, intent can be in-
ferred from circumstantial evidence.47
In short, a civil RICO claim can be predicated on any allegedly
fraudulent scheme that is advanced, no matter how slightly, by the
use of the mails or wires.The scheme need not even take advantage
of interstate mails. The plaintiff also is not required to have any di-
rect evidence of the defendant's fraudulent intent, rather that in-
tent can be inferred from the circumstances of the alleged scheme.
Given the prevalent use of the mails, facsimiles, the internet, and
telephones in modern business (regardless of its size), it is difficult
to imagine how any business that engages in allegedly fraudulent
activity can escape the reach of the mail and/or wire fraud statutes.
Thus, what used to be common law fraud is now a RICO violation.
RICO's unlimited application under the mail and wire fraud
statutes has led the Supreme Court to lament:
It is true that private civil actions under the statute
are being brought almost solely against [legitimate] busi-
ness defendants, rather than against the archetypal, in-
timidating mobster. Yet this defect-if defect it is-is in-
herent in the statute as written, and its correction must lie
with Congress. It is not for the judiciary to eliminate the
private action in situations where Congress has provided it
simply because plaintiffs are taking advantage of it in its
more difficult applications.
We nonetheless recognize that, in its private civil ver-
sion, RICO is evolving into something quite different from
the original conception of its enactors.... The "extraor-
dinary" uses to which civil RICO has been put appear to
be primarily the result of the breadth of the predicate of-
fenses, inj'Particular the inclusion of wire [and] mail...
fraud....
47. See, e.g., United States v. Cochran, 109 F.3d 660, 668 (10th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Berndt, 86 F.3d 803, 809 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Sawyer,
85 F.3d 713, 731 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Wonderly, 70 F.3d 1020, 1023
(8th Cir. 1995); United States v. D'Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1994);
United States v. Ham, 998 F.2d 1247, 1254 (4th Cir. 1993).
48. Sedima, S.P.L.R. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499-500 (1985). The Su-
preme Court also blamed RICO's breadth on the inclusion of securities fraud as a
predicate act. See id. Securities fraud was eliminated from RICO's list of racketeer-
ing activities, pursuant to the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 9107, 109 Star. 737, 758 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
1964(c)).
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C. Treble Damages
Without more than RICO's liberal legislative history and the mail
and wire fraud predicate acts, the expansive use of RICO was a possi-
bility at the time of its passage, but the statute's treble damage provi-
sion made RICO's expansive use inevitable. Many courts could not
accept that, under RICO, most common law fraud claims were now
federal statutory claims entitling the plaintiff to recover three times its
actual damages and, as a result, strained to dismiss RICO claims:
It is impossible for this Court to believe that in enact-
ing RICO Congress intended to sweep all ordinary injuries
occasioned by the predicate criminal acts within the drag-
net of the treble damage remedy provided by § 1964. In
almost all cases, a person injured by a predicate crime will
have a cause of action for damages under either federal or
state law. For example, it would seem illogical that a plain-
tiff suing under [state] laws could recover only one-third
of the damages recoverable by a person suing under
RICO for the identical injury. Certainly, this Court would
not attribute to Congress an intention to make this fun-
damental change in the nature of private damage reme-
dies absent some clear indication that such a drastic result
was envisioned.
There is no evidence, however, that RICO was de-
signed to retool private remedies in this manner. It was
simply not intended to provide a plaintiff with a windfall
recovery for ordinary injuries which are otherwise com-
pensable.49
Despite the courts' expressed dismay, the tide of RICO litigation
could not be stopped. Congress clearly included mail and wire fraud
as predicate acts, and given the breadth of mail and wire fraud in the
criminal context, almost every common law business fraud claim
could be and was converted into a civil RICO claim entitling the
plaintiff to three times their actual damages. The inclusion of a
RICO claim, whenever possible, was only logical. The threat of treble
damages, at the very least, gave the plaintiffs greater leverage in trying
to settle a claim, no matter how spurious its RICO underpinnings
49. Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235, 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1983),
aff'd sub. nom., Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhodes, 741 F.2d 511, 512 (2d Cir. 1984), va-
cated, 473 U.S. 922 (1985) (citations omitted); see also Berg v. First Am. Bankshares,
Inc., 599 F. Supp. 500, 506 (D.D.C. 1984), affd, 796 F.2d 489, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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50
were.
III. EARLY UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORTS TO CONTAIN RICO
Beginning in the late-70s to early-80s, the courts began to rec-
ognize that RICO's breadth, which was originally extolled as a vir-
tue, was fast becoming a despicable vice. As civil RICO litigation
became more popular, courts began to fashion means by which to
eliminate the threat of treble damages in garden-variety business
fraud claims. Thus, it became common for courts to dismiss civil
RICO claims on the following bases: (1) defendants had not been
criminally convicted of committing a predicate act; (2) plaintiffs
did not allege a racketeering injury; and (3) plaintiffs had alleged
only one fraudulent scheme. All of these methods, however, were
eventually rejected by the Supreme Court.
A. The "Prior Criminal Conviction" Theory
RICO expressly states that a person can be liable under RICO
if they are "indictable" under the mail and wire fraud statutes or
other laws defining racketeering activity. 2 Nonetheless, the Second
Circuit read into civil RICO a conviction qualification, i.e., a civil
plaintiff could not bring a RICO action for damages unless the de-
fendant had previously been convicted of a predicate offense. 53
The court reasoned:
The Act is designed to provide new penalties and
remedies to combat conduct which explicitly has already
been found criminal .... RICO liability simply does not
exist without criminal conduct, though of course, in a
criminal RICO case, the proof of the predicate act convic-
50. See Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d
384, 399 n.16 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[a] number of courts dismayed by civil RICO have
commented on the in terrorem settlement value that the threat of treble damages
may add to spurious claims. After all, the line between fraud and mistake or mis-
understanding can be a very fine one."), affd, 469 U.S. 1157 (1985); UNR Indus.,
Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 623 F. Supp. 1319, 1331 (D. Ill. 1985) (refusing to al-
low amendment to include RICO claim on the basis that the amendment was
merely sought "because of the in terrorem effect of any treble damage or racketeer-
ing claim").
51. See infrta notes 53-78 and accompanying text.
52. See 18 U.S.C. §1961(1) (1994) (defining "racketeering activity" under the
statute).
53. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 503 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd,
473 U.S. 479, 500 (1984).
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tions may be made under the same indictment, in the
same trial and coordinately with the proof of the RICO
offense (s). But in a civil context, there is no way to know
whether the [predicate] conduct in question is "already
criminal," a problem compounded by the fact that ordi-
narily there is a lower burden of proof in civil actions. We
conclude that had Congress considered this problem, it
would have explicitly required previously established con-
victions in the context of section 1964(c). Absent such
explicit congressional direction, such a narrow reading of
section 1964(c) best integrates that subsection into the
entire structure of the Act. On the other hand, if the
broad reading is accepted, problems are created of which
there is no indication that Congress even dreamed .
The prior criminal conviction qualification gained acceptance
outside of the Second Circuit but continued to be questioned.55
The Supreme Court eventually rejected the "prior conviction limi-
tation" as being contrary to RICO's use of the word "indictable"
and its broad purposes and/or history.56
B. The "Racketeering Injury" Theory
Many courts avoided the application of RICO to legitimate
business by focusing on passages in the statute's legislative history
54. Id. at 500-01; see also Alkoff v. Gold, 611 F. Supp. 63, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(dismissing RICO claim which fails to allege criminal convictions for predicate
acts); Bridge C.A.T. Scan Assoc. v. Ohio-Nuclear Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1187, 1193
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (dismissing RICO claim where no allegation of conviction if a
predicate act); Rooney Pace, Inc. v. Reid, 605 F. Supp. 158, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(stating that allegation of conviction of any predicate acts alleged is a necessary
element of a RICO claim); In re Osage Exploration Co., 104 F.R.D. 45, 49-50
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (denying leave to amend complaint to add RICO claim where no
criminal convictions allege predicate acts).
55. Compare Butler Mfg. Co. v. Convey-All, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 1203, 1204 (N.D.
Ala. 1985) (dismissing a civil RICO action on the basis that defendants had not
been criminally convicted of committing a predicate act), Viola v. Bensalem Town-
ship, 601 F. Supp. 1086, 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1984), vacated, 774 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir.
1985) (same), Terra Du Lac Ass'n v. Terra Du Lac, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 257, 261
(E.D. Mo. 1984), affd in part, rev'd in part, 772 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1985) (same),
and Berg v. First Am. Bankshares, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 500, 506 (D.D.C. 1984), affd,
796 F.2d 489 (D.C. Cir. 1986), with Wang Lab., Inc. v. Burts, 612 F. Supp. 441, 447
(D. Md. 1984) (refusing to apply prior conviction limitation), Glusband v. Benja-
min, 530 F. Supp. 240, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (same), Heinhold Commodities, Inc. v.
McCarty, 513 F. Supp. 311, 313-14 (N.D. IIl. 1979) (same).
56. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 488-493 (1985) (stating
that racketeering activity under the statute consists not of acts which the defen-
dant has been convicted but of acts for which he could be).
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that arguably limited RICO's application to plaintiffs who experi-
enced a "racketeering injury" or whose injuries had a nexus with
"organized crime." One of the first cases to rely on this approach
was Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc.," which involved a telephone answering
service that purportedly billed clients for messages that were never
taken.58 The court dismissed the claim, on the basis that the plain-
tiffs injuries had no nexus with organized crime, or, in other
words, were not "racketeering injuries:"
The legislative history makes frequent references to "rack-
eteers", "organized crime" and "organized crime families,"
as well as the "syndicate," "Mafia," and "Cosa Nostra." It is
clear that it was aimed not at legitimate business organiza-
tions but at combating "a society of criminals who seek to
operate outside of the control of the American people
and their governments. There is no question that the de-
fendant cannot be so characterized.
5 9
The "nexus with organized crime" or "racketeering injury" ap-
proach, however, suffered many problems. First, such a qualifica-
tion is not found in the statute or legislative history. ° Second, the
terms "organized crime" or "racketeering injury" were hopelessly
vague. Some courts tried to remedy the vagueness by equating the
qualification with "sinister scheme [s] to defraud, 1 by stating that
"[a] person who suffers a [racketeering] injury should 'know it
when [he feels] it," 62 or by requiring the plaintiff to be injured by
the RICO violation rather than the individual predicate acts.
These attempts to remedy the vagueness of the standard only made
57. 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
58. See id. at 112.
59. Id. at 113.
60. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1994).
61. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235, 1242 (S.D.N.Y.
1983), affd sub. nom., Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 512 (2d Cir.
1984), and vacated, 473 U.S. 922 (1985).
62. UNR Indus., Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 623 F. Supp. 1319, 1331 (N.D.
Ill. 1985) (citingJacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (StewartJ, concur-
ring)).
63. See, e.g., Doxie v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 603 F. Supp. 624, 628 (S.D. Ga.
1984) (stating that injury must result from the RICO violation)); Happy Dack
Trading Co. v. Agro-Indus. Inc., 602 F. Supp. 986, 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (dismissing
RICO claim where injury alleged was from predicate acts not from "racketeering
activity"); Gardner v. Surnamer, 599 F. Supp. 477, 479-80 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (dismiss-
ing claim where injury was allegedly caused by predicate acts); Guerrero v. Katzen,
571 F. Supp. 714, 719 (D.D.C. 1983) (holding that the alleged injury must be "of
the type that RICO intended to prevent").
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matters worse. Accordingly, the "nexus with organized crime" or
"racketeering injury' requirement also was rejected by the Supreme
Court as being "unhelpfully tautological:"&
Apart from reliance on the general purposes of RICO and
a reference to "mobsters," the court [below] provided
scant indication of what the requirement of racketeering
injury means.... The court below is not alone in strug-
gling to define "racketeering injury," and the difficulty of
that task itself cautions against imposing such a require-
ment.... If the defendant engages in a pattern of racket-
eering activity in a manner forbidden by these provisions,
and the racketeering activities injure the plaintiff in his
business or property, the plaintiff has a claim under §
1964(c). There is no room in the statutory language for
an additional, amorphous "racketeering injury" require-
ment.
65
C. The "Multiple Scheme" Theory
The problem with both the "prior conviction" and "racketeer-
ing injury" qualifications was that they bore no logical relationship
to the wording of the statute. In Sedima, the Supreme Court at-
tempted to focus the lower courts' effort to limit RICO on the lan-
guage of the statute by commenting on the statute's required "pat-
tern of racketeering activity. "  The Supreme Court stated that
"[t]he infiltration of legitimate business normally requires more
than one 'racketeering activity' and the threat of continuity to be
effective .... ; [ i]t is this factor of continuity plus relationship which• • 1,,67
combines to produce a pattern. The Eighth Circuit seized upon
this language in Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, where an oil company
brought a RICO claim against former employees who were respon-• • 69
sible for pumping operations. The plaintiff alleged that the em-
ployees had procured fraudulent letters of approval to install
equipment that allowed them to literally siphon-off thousands of
dollars of liquid propane and oil throughout their employment.70
64. Sedima, S.P.R.L.v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 494 (1985).
65. Id. at 494-95 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
66. Id. at 496.
67. Id. at 496 n.14 (citing legislative history defining a pattern of racketeering
activity).
68. 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986).
69. See id. at 253-54
70. See id.
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The court dismissed the claim stating:
[P] roof of a "pattern of racketeering activity" "requires
more than one 'racketeering activity' and the threat of
continuing activity to be effective. It is this factor of con-
tinuity plus relationship which combines to produce a pat-
tern." [Plaintiff] clearly has proved the "relationship"
prong. They proved several related acts of mail and wire
fraud in pursuit of the underlying conversion or theft of
gas from [Plaintiff's] interstate pipeline.
[Plaintiff] has, however, failed to prove the "continu-
ity" sufficient to form a "pattern of racketeering activity."
The actions of [Defendants] comprised one continuing
scheme to convert gas from [Plaintiff's] pipeline. There
was no proof that [Defendants] had ever done these ac-
tivities in the past and there was no proof that they were
engaged in other criminal activities elsewhere.
"[I]t is difficult to see how the threat of continuing
activity stressed in the Senate Report could be established
by a single criminal episode.... It places a real strain on
the language to speak of a single fraudulent effort, im-
plemented by several fraudulent acts, as a "pattern of
racketeering activity."7
Thus, in the Eighth Circuit and other courts, plaintiffs had to
allege more than one fraudulent scheme in order to sustain a
RICO claim." This qualification was the ally of product manufac-
turers sued under RICO. Using the qualification, several RICO
claims based on allegedly fraudulent product advertising were dis-
missed; the courts reasoned that the "marketing of a single product
71. Id. at 257 (quoting Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco, Inc.,
615 F. Supp. 828, 832 (N.D. Ill. 1985)); see also Wright v. Everett Cash Mut. Ins.
Co., 637 F. Supp. 155, 158 (W.D. Pa. 1986).
72. See, e.g., Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925, 929 (10th Cir. 1987)
(holding that RICO does not apply to an isolated incident); United States v.
McClendon, 712 F. Supp. 723, 730 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (dismissing RICO indictment
that alleged but one scheme); In re EPIC Mortgage Ins. Litig., 701 F. Supp. 1192,
1253 (E.D. Va. 1988), afJfd in part, rev'd in part, 910 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1990); Pince-
tich v. Jeanfreau, 699 F. Supp. 1469, 1476 (D. Or. 1988) (dismissing RICO claim
where predicate acts constituted a single scheme); Perkins v. Nash, 697 F. Supp.
527, 531 (D.D.C. 1988) (holding single victim of a single fraudulent transaction
fails to meet elements of RICO claim); Rochester Midland Corp. v. Mesko, 696 F.
Supp. 262, 266-68 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (holding that activity in furtherance of a sin-
gle scheme does not, as a matter of law, constitute a pattern); Manax v.
McNamara, 660 F. Supp. 657, 663-64 (W.D. Tex. 1987), affd, 842 F.2d 808 (5th
Cir. 1988).
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constitute [d] only one fraudulent scheme.
73
The multiple scheme qualification, however, was not uniformly
accepted 74 and was eventually rejected by the Supreme Court in
H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell.
75
Under the approach adopted by the Supreme Court, a "pat-
tern or racketeering activity" existed whenever the predicate acts
were related, i.e., have the same or similar purposes, results, partici-
pants, victims, or methods of commission or otherwise are interre-
lated and not isolated events,76 and sufficiently continuous, i.e., ex-
tended over a substantial period of time or posed a specific threat77
of repetition extending indefinitely into the future. Accordingly,
a product manufacturer whose allegedly fraudulent advertising
campaign targeted a group of consumers (i.e., victims) and lasted
over a substantial period could arguably be held liable under
RICO.
In short, product manufacturers cannot escape liability under
RICO by arguing that they have never been convicted of a crime,
that they did not inflict a "racketeering injury," or that they have
not engaged in a "pattern" because the allegedly false advertise-
ments relate to only one product. To escape RICO, manufacturers
must be far more creative.
IV. CURRENTLY AVAILABLE THEORIES OF CONTAINMENT
Although the prior conviction, nexus with organized crime,
and multiple scheme approaches have been rejected by the Su-
preme Court, several other arguments may enable a product manu-
facturer to shed a nuisance RICO claim. As with all RICO defen-
73. In re Dow Co. Sarabond Prod. Liab. Litig., 666 F. Supp. 1466, 1473 (D.
Colo. 1987); see also Wight v. Agristor Leasing, 652 F. Supp. 1000, 1022 (D. Kan.
1987); Behunin v. Dow Chem. Co., 650 F. Supp. 1387, 1389 (D. Colo. 1986); Savas-
tano v. Thompson Med. Co., 640 F. Supp. 1081, 1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
74. See, e.g., Deppe v. Tripp, 863 F.2d 1356, 1367 (7th Cir. 1988); Blake v.
Dierdorff, 856 F.2d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1988); Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 51 (2d Cir. 1987); First Fin. Serv. Bank, Inc. v. American
Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 1167, 1171 (E.D.N.C. 1988); Bamett
v. Stem, 93 B.R. 962, 974-75 (N.D. Ill. 1988), rev'd, 909 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1990);
Smith v. MCI Telecom. Corp., 678 F. Supp. 823, 827 (D. Kan. 1987), reh'g denied,
124 F.R.D. 665 (D. Kan. 1989); Greenfield v. Professional Care, Inc., 677 F. Supp.
110, 116 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Moravian Dev. Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 651 F. Supp.
144,147 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
75. 492 U.S. 299 (1989).
76. Id. at 240.
77. Id. at 242.
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dants, a product manufacturer can attack the claim on the basis of
18
the statute of limitations, or on the sufficiency of the pattern alle-
gations, but this article focuses on those arguments most applicable
and helpful in the product context: (A) RICO's "injury to business
or property" qualification; (B) RICO's proximate cause standard;
(C) RICO's requirement that there be a distinction between the
person and the enterprise with which the person associates; and
(D) the rule of in pari materia, which requires the courts to interpret
RICO's civil remedy provision in conjunction with the restitution al-
lowed to victims under the criminal mail and wire fraud statutes.
A. Injury to Business or Property
The oldest and most effective means for a product manufac-
turer to rid itself of a RICO claim also may be the most obvious.
RICO's civil remedy provision provides a cause of action to "[a]ny
person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of
section 1962." 79 As a result, a RICO claim can be based only on in-
juries to one's financial interests; conduct giving rise to personal
injuries is not actionable under RICO. For instance, in Moore v. Eli
Lilly and Co.,80 the plaintiffs brought a claim against the defendant
alleging negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability arising
out of the defendant's manufacture and sale of a drug."' The plain-
tiffs subsequently learned that the defendant had allegedly made
misrepresentations related to the defective nature of the drug and
82
sought to amend their complaint to include a RICO claim. The
court denied the plaintiffs' motion to amend:
Recognizing that the statute establishes rights and reme-
dies only for persons injured in their "business or prop-
erty," plaintiffs claim that the alleged diminution of
[plaintiff's] estate and the loss of consortium allegedly
suffered by [plaintiffs wife] are injuries to "property."
This contention, however, is incorrect. Plaintiffs' allega-
tions constitute conventional claims for personal inju-
ries .... If Congress had intended that the rights and
78. See, e.g., Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 117 S. Ct. 1984, 1992 (1997) (RICO
claim dismissed where plaintiff should have realized that the product advertise-
ments were fraudulent, as alleged, more than four years before he filed his claim);
Agristor Fin. Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 240-42 (6th Cir. 1992) (same).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994) (emphasis added).
80. 626 F. Supp. 365 (D. Mass. 1986).
81. See id. at 366.
82. See id.
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remedies established by RICO be available in every per-
sonal injury action involving financial loss, it could easily
have enacted a statute referring to "injury" generally or
have referred expressly to injury to "persons" in addition
to injury to "business or property." As the Supreme Court
stated in interpreting the identical "business or property"
language in the Clayton Act, "Congress must have in-
tended to exclude some class of injuries by the phrase
'business or property.'
83
Thus, if a plaintiff merely brings a RICO claim against a product
manufacturer on the basis of a personal injury, then that claim
should easily be extinguished 8
83. Id. at 366-67 (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339
(1979)); see also Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 918 (3d Cir. 1991);
Grogan v. Platt, 835 F.2d 844, 847 (11th Cir. 1988); Bankers Trust v. Rhoades, 741
F.2d 511, 515 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated, 473 U.S. 922 (1985); Gaines v. Texas Tech
Univ., 965 F. Supp. 886, 890 (N.D. Tex. 1997); Enrich v. B.A.T. Indus., P.L.C., 964
F. Supp. 164, 167 (D.N.J. 1997); Reynolds v. Condon, 908 F. Supp. 1494, 1518
(N.D. Iowa 1995); Fried v. Sungard Recovery Serv., Inc., 900 F. Supp. 758, 762
(E.D. Pa. 1995); Allman v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 665, 667-69 (S.D. Cal.
1994); Raye v. Medtronic Corp., 696 F. Supp. 1273, 1274 (D. Minn. 1988); Bast v.
A.H. Robins, 616 F. Supp. 333, 335 (D. Wisc. 1985); Campbell v. A.H. Robins Co.,
Inc., 615 F. Supp. 496, 501 (W.D. Wisc. 1985).
84. Product manufacturers, however, need to be careful in the area of per-
sonal injury claims covered by their insurer. Insurance companies have sued their
insureds under RICO alleging that the insured obtained insurance or policy bene-
fits by virtue of mail or wire fraud. See, e.g., Ocaso, S.A. Compania De Seguros y
Reaseguros, 915 F. Supp. 1244, 1266 (D.P.R. 1996) (dismissing insurer's RICO
claim alleging that it was fraudulently induced by insured to issue insurance; the
claim lacked the necessary duration to satisfy RICO's continuity requirement); Co-
lonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Value Rent-a-car, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 1084, 1091-92 (S.D. Fla.
1992) (court denied summary judgment on insured's RICO claim where insurer
alleged that the insured had submitted monthly reports that misrepresented the
number of automobiles under the policy and misrepresented the monthly gross
receipts). One could see this situation arising in the context of product liability
actions where, over several months or years, numerous individual personal injury
actions are brought against the insured on the basis of a faulty product. Assume
the insurer settles all of the claims on the basis of the insured's representations
that the claims are meritorious, presenting serious issues of negligence, product
liability, and breach of warranty. Later, the insurer discovers evidence that the
product problems were not the result of negligence but the result of intentional or
reckless wrongdoing by the insured and that the insured advocated a quick settle-
ment of the claims to avoid discovery of the damning evidence that would remove
the claims from coverage. Under such a scenario, the insurance company may
have been fraudulently induced to settle the personal injury claims, thereby sus-
taining injury to its business or property, and may have an actionable RICO claim.
Admittedly, such a scenario must seem like bad fiction to most legitimate manu-
facturers, but given the breadth of the mail and wire fraud statutes, and the fact
that a lawsuit can be initiated on no more than scant evidence, manufacturers
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B. Proximate Cause
In Sedima, the Supreme Court rejected the "prior conviction"
and "racketeering injury" limitations on civil RICO claims but did not
close the door on all limitations. The Supreme Court indicated that
it would favorably view a "proximate cause" limitation based on
RICO's requirement that plaintiffs experience injury "by reason of'
the RICO violation:
85
[A RICO] plaintiff only has standing if, and can only re-
cover to the extent that, he has been injured in his busi-
ness or property by the conduct constituting the violation.
As the Seventh Circuit has stated, "[a] defendant who vio-
lates section 1962 is not liable for treble damages to eve-
ryone he might have injured by his conduct, nor is the de-
fendant liable to those who have not been injured."
86
The Supreme Court revisited this theme in Holmes v. Securities In-
vestor Protection Corp.8' and held that a RICO plaintiff was entitled to
damages only if his injuries were "proximately caused" by the RICO
violation.8 In Holmes, the defendants manipulated the stock of vari-
ous companies by making unduly optimistic representations and by
continually selling small quantities of stock to create the appearance
of a liquid market.89 A number of broker-dealers bought substantial
amounts of the stock, but when the defendants' fraud was disclosed,
the value of the stock plummeted.90 The broker-dealers were forced
into liquidation.9' The Securities Investor Protection Corporation
("SIPC") was then obligated to advance nearly $13 million to cover
the claims of the broker-dealers' customers, whose money was lost
when the broker-dealers failed even though the customers never in-92
vested in the stock manipulated by the defendants. The SIPC then
brought a RICO claim against the defendants to recoup the losses
paid to the broker-dealers' customers.93 The district court granted
should monitor their representations to their insurers to make certain that such a
fiction does not become reality.
85. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994).
86. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496-97 (quoting Haroco, Inc.
v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984),
affd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985)).
87. 503 U.S. 258 (1992)
88. See id. at 276.
89. See id. at 262.
90. See id.
91. Seeid. at 263.
92. See id.
93. See id.
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the defendants' motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the
defendants' conduct directly injured the broker-dealers, not the cus-
tomers; thus, the customers' injuries were too remote from the viola-
tion to warrant recovery under RICO. 4
The Supreme Court affirmed:
[RICO's civil provision] can, of course, be read to
mean that a plaintiff is injured "by reason of' a RICO vio-
lation, and therefore may recover, simply on showing that
the defendant violated 1962, the plaintiff was injured, and
the defendant's violation was a "but for" cause of plain-
tiff's injury. This construction is hardly compelled, how-
ever, and the very likelihood that Congress intended to al-
low all factually injured plaintiffs to recover persuades us
that RICO should not get such an expansive reading....
Thus, we h[o]ld that a plaintiffs right to sue under [sec-
tion 1964(c)] require[s] a showing that the defendant's
violation not only was a "but for" cause of his injury, but
was the proximate cause as well ....
Here we use "proximate cause" to label generically
the judicial tools used to limit a person's responsibility for
the consequences of that person's own acts.... [Such a
limitation is well founded.] ... First, the less direct an in-
jury is, the more difficult it becomes to ascertain the
amount of a plaintiffs damages attributable to the viola-
tion, as distinct from other, independent factors. Second,
quite apart from problems of proving factual causation,
recognizing claims of the indirectly injured would force
courts to adopt complicated rules apportioning damages
among plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from
the violative acts, to obviate the risk of multiple recoveries.
And, finally, the need to grapple with these problems is
simply unjustified by the general interest in deterring in-
jurious conduct, since directly injured victims can gener-
ally be counted on to vindicate the law as private attorneys
general, without any of the problems attendant upon suits
by plaintiffs injured more remotely.95
The Supreme Court's use of the term 'judicial tools" makes it
clear that RICO's proximate cause standard presents a legal issue, not
a factual issue like common law proximate cause standards. As a re-
sult, Holmes' causation analysis has been expanded by the circuit
94. See id. at 263-64.
95. Id. at 265-70 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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courts.96 Generally, proximate causation may be found lacking, as a
matter of law, whenever any one of the following conditions is pres-
ent: (1) a third party was directly injured by the predicate activity and
the plaintiff's injuries flow only from the injuries to the third party;
(2) non-predicate activity or independent factors caused or contrib-
uted to the plaintiffs injury; or (3) the plaintiffs did not rely on the
predicate activity, in cases of mail and wire fraud.
1. Intervening Third-Parties
RICO's proximate cause standard is most commonly used in
situations analogous to Holmes, i.e., where the plaintiffs injuries are.. .. 97
the result of predicate activity directed at a third party. This rule has
also enabled product manufacturers to avoid RICO liability. In City
& County of San Francisco v. Philip Morris, Inc., governmental entities
96. See generally Stephen Scallen, Proximate Cause under RICO, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J.
455, 455-505 (1996) (discussing the history and development of proximate cause
in civil RICO actions prior to and after Holmes).
97. See, e.g., Anaren Microwave, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 49 F.3d 62, 63 (2d Cir. 1995)
(per curiam) (finding that an electrical component manufacturer could not prove
proximate cause under RICO where defendants' predicate activity directly injured a
prime contractor who was denied a contract on the basis of the defendant's fraud and
who listed the manufacturer as a subcontractor); Mendelovitz v. Vosicky, 40 F.3d 182,
186-87 (7th Cir. 1994) (dismissing RICO claim where the plaintiffs' damages were
caused by defendants' predicate acts and third-parties' decision to sue corporation in
which the plaintiffs held shares); Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro v. Lerner, 31 F.3d 924,
928-29 (9th Cir. 1994) (dismissing RICO claim brought by subtenant against the
owner of a building who had fraudulently manipulated the building's value to obtain
rent increases from the master tenant; the court held that the master tenant was di-
rectly injured by the racketeering activity and that the subtenant was only indirectly
injured by reason of the master tenant's decision to pass on the rent increases); Bieter
Co. v. Blomquist, 987 F.2d 1319, 1325-27 (8th Cir. 1993) (tenants of a real estate de-
velopment that was approved by virtue of defendant's bribery of public officials would
not have had standing under RICO, even though the bribery may have caused them
to pay higher rents; the proper plaintiff was the real estate developer for a competing
development whose approval was denied as a direct result of the defendants' predi-
cate activity); Imagineering, Inc. v. Kiewit Pacific Co., 976 F.2d 1303, 1312 (9th Cir.
1992) (reasoning that since plaintiffs were minority business enterprises ("MBE")
subcontractors who sued a prime contractor that had fraudulently stated its compli-
ance with MBE requirements and been awarded various government contracts at the
expense of the prime contractors with whom plaintiffs were associated; the plaintiffs'
claim was dismissed because plaintiffs' prime contractors, not the subcontracting
MBE's, were directly injured by the defendant's fraud); Firestone v. Galbreath, 976
F.2d 279, 285 (6th Cir. 1992) (dismissing RICO claim brought by heirs against defen-
dants who had fraudulently induced the heirs' grandmother to part with her fortune;
the court held that the grandmother (or her estate) were the direct victims of the
fraud and that the heirs stood in too remote a position to recover).
98. 957 F. Supp. 1130 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
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brought a RICO claim against cigarette manufacturers alleging that
the manufacturers engaged in a conspiracy to mislead the govern-
mental entities and their residents without regard to the dangers of
smoking and the addictiveness of nicotine.99 As a result of the ciga-
rette manufacturers' alleged fraud, the governmental entities claimed
that they spent millions of dollars each year to provide health care to
residents suffering from diseases caused by smoking.' °° The govern-
mental entities sought to recover the health care costs that they had
incurred on behalf of residents.101 The court dismissed the claim:
[T] he attenuated chain of causation upon which plaintiffs
rely is as follows: (1) the tobacco manufacturers made mis-
leading statements regarding the health consequences of
smoking and manipulated the levels of nicotine in ciga-
rettes; (2) as a result of this conduct, plaintiffs' residents
smoked in greater numbers and continued to smoke for
longer periods of time; (3) these smokers developed
health problems from their use of cigarettes; (4) these
smokers then sought medical care from plaintiffs; and (5)
plaintiffs spent money to provide such health care ....
[T]his Court finds that any alleged violations of duties to
the plaintiffs in the present case have not been directly
linked to plaintiffs' increased health care expenses given
the existence of the essential intervening link of the in-
jured individual smokers. 10
The circumstances of tobacco litigation are fairly unique, but
similar situations are imaginable. For example, a medical drug or de-
vice manufacturer may be sued by a physician in a small community
who claims his practice was ruined when he relied on the manufac-
turer's allegedly fraudulent advertising to prescribe a drug or method
of treatment to several patients. After the drug or device failed to
work as advertised, or perhaps even harmed the patients, the patients
lost faith in the physician and his reputation in the small community
was destroyed. Holmes should be helpful in this situation because the
patients, not the physician, are the directly injured parties. Likewise,
assume a real estate developer hires a contractor to construct a build-
ing. The contractor buys a new piece of equipment for the sole pur-
pose of meeting the unique requirements of the project. The proj-
ect, however, falls behind schedule after the equipment fails to
99. Seeid.at1134.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. Id. at 1137.
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perform as advertised. If the developer brought a RICO suit against
the equipment manufacturer for losses related to the delayed con-
struction, Holmes again should protect the manufacturer. The con-
tractor, not the developer, is the directly injured party.
2. Intervening Non-predicate Activity or Independent Factors
Beyond circumstances where the defendant is separated from
the plaintiff by a more directly injured third-party, the application of
Holmes is still uncertain, but many courts are creatively experimenting
with RICO's proximate cause standard in this arena. Some of the
most helpful experiments relate to the Supreme Court's directive in
Sedima that a RICO plaintiff "can only recover to the extent that, he
has been injured in his business or property by the conduct constitut-
ing the violation"' and its statement in Holmes that courts should be
cautious when it is difficult to attribute "damages... to the [RICO]..... ,,104
violation, as distinct from other, independent factors. Some courts
have interpreted this language as sanctioning the dismissal of RICO
claims where a defendant has violated RICO but the plaintiffs dam-
ages do not arise out of the RICO violation-rather, the plaintiff is
directly damaged by the defendant's non-predicate conduct or other
independent factors. In other words, a plaintiffs injuries must be the
proximate result of the defendant's mail or wire fraud; otherwise, the
claim cannot stand. °5 For example, in Brandenburg v. Seidel,°6 plain-
tiffs were depositors in a savings and loan institution insured by a state107 • -. 108
agency. The institution was placed in receivership. At the same
time, a run on all savings and loan institutions was caused by evidence
of widespread fraud in the savings and loan industry.' Given that
the agency had insufficient assets to meet the demands of investors,
pay-outs from the agency were frozen; investors thereafter lost any
chance to recover interest that otherwise would have been earned on
103. Sedima, S.P.L.R.v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985).
104. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269 (1992).
105. See Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 897 F.2d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 1990).
This rule even applies in the context of RICO conspiracies. A Section 1964(d) RICO
conspiracy cannot be based on any overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, it must
be based on predicate racketeering activity. See id. "Congress did not deploy RICO as
an instrument against all unlawful acts." Id.
106. 859 F.2d 1179 (4th Cir. 1988).
107. See id. at 1181.
108. See id. at 1182.
109. See id. at 1181.
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their money."0  The investors brought a RICO claim against the
agency alleging that it had fraudulently represented that the institu-
tion was adequately insured."' The court dismissed the complaint
and stated:
Obviously the two most immediate causes were the alleged
depredations of the insured institution's management,
and the [agency's] negligent or reckless failure to prevent
those depredations. That of course is what directly caused
the run and ruin that followed, and neither of these of
course constitute RICO predicate acts chargeable to these
defendants. That these are in practical terms the inter-
vening direct causes of the tragic losses sustained is of
course reflected in the fact that they provide the basis for
thesel 2plaintiffs' related pendent state claims in this ac-
tion.
Based upon this same reasoning, courts have also refused to en-
tertain RICO claims where the plaintiffs damages were apparently
caused by intervening, independent factors wholly unrelated to the
110. Seeid. at 1182.
111. Seeid.at 1183.
112. Id. at 1190; see also In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 916 F.2d 874, 883 (3d Cir. 1990)
(finding that RICO claims were not actionable because plaintiffs' damages were
caused by defendants' mismanagement and other wrongdoing, not by the fraud upon
which plaintiffs RICO claims were predicated); Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House,
Inc., 897 F.2d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 1990) (elucidating that "Congress did not deploy RICO
as an instrument against all unlawful acts... [but rather] target[s] only predicate acts
catalogued under section 1961 (1)"); Grantham & Mann Inc. v. American Safety
Prod., 831 F.2d 596, 606 (6th Cir. 1987) (dismissing plaintiffs RICO claim because
the damages claimed were caused by defendant's breach of contract, not by defen-
dant's fraudulent assurances that the breach would be remedied); Bernstein v. Misk,
948 F. Supp. 228, 240 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that "[plaintifFs] major losses ... ap-
pear to have occurred more directly as a result of the [defendant's] failure to make
the lease payments on equipment and [defendant's] denial of entry to abortion pa-
tients... [and therefore] [t]hese actions do not constitute racketeering acts because
they cannot proximately cause a RICO violation"); Lui Ciro, Inc. v. Ciro, Inc., 895 F.
Supp. 1365, 1379 (D. Haw. 1995) (dismissing RICO claim where "[t]he main inter-
vening causes come not in the form of other parties as in [Imagineering]; rather, they
come in the form of other conduct necessary to set the losses in motion, namely the
defaults on the loans which the [plaintiffs] have guaranteed."); Red Ball Interior
Demolition Corp. v. Palmadessa, 874 F. Supp. 576, 586-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding
that a RICO plaintiffs injuries must be proximately caused by the predicate acts,
where "[a] n act which proximately caused an injury is analytically distinct from one
which furthered, facilitated, permitted or concealed an injury which happened or
could have happened independently of the act"); North Barrington Dev. Inc. v. Fans-
low, 547 F. Supp. 207, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (stating that courts should not "award
treble damages for breach of contract or common law fraud where the distinctive
RICO violations did not contribute to plaintiffs injury").
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defendant's predicate acts. For example, in First Nationwide Bank v.
Gelt Funding Corp.," 3 the plaintiff brought a RICO claim alleging that
the defendant misrepresented the value of real estate acquired by the
plaintiff.' 14 The Second Circuit dismissed the claim and stated:
The value and profitability of multi-unit apartment com-
plexes in New York ... depend upon many factors that in-
fluence the general real estate market including changes
in rent controls laws, property taxes, vacancy rates, the
level of city services provided, and increased operating
expenses including electric and heating oil prices. Given
the complexity of the New York real estate market, and
the fact that [plaintiff's] losses came in the wake of a
downturn in the real estate market, [plaintiff] must allege
loss causation with sufficient particularity such that we can
determine whether the factual basis for its claim, if
proven, could support an inference of groximate cause.
[Plaintiff cannot] meet this burden ....
Accordingly, the rationale expressed in Holmes has been used to
dismiss RICO claims where the defendant's alleged RICO violation
and the plaintiffs injuries are separated by non-predicate activity or
independent factors.
Martin v. A.0. Smith Corp."6 exemplifies how a product-based
RICO claim can be affected by non-predicate activity and/or inde-
pendent factors.' 7 In Martin, the plaintiffs were farmers who pur-
113. 27 F.3d 763 (2d Cir. 1994).
114. See id. at 765.
115. Id. at 770-72 (citation omitted); see also Barr Lab., Inc. v. Quantum Pharmics,
Inc., 827 F. Supp. 111, 116 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (dismissing plaintiff's claim that it had lost
drug sales as a result of competing drug that had been approved by the government
on the basis of defendant's false statements, noting independent factors unrelated to
the predicate acts; regardless of the predicate acts, the government still may have ap-
proved the drug, or even if government approval had never been granted, there was
no assurance that consumers would have bought plaintiff's product as opposed to
other products available on the market); Sheperd v. American Honda Motor Co.,
Inc., 822 F. Supp. 625, 630-31 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (dismissing plaintiffs RICO claim al-
leging that the value of their car dealership had been adversely affected by defen-
dants' fraudulent scheme to refuse to ship the dealership "high demand" cars, rea-
soning that the declining dealership value could have been caused by a multitude of
factors unrelated to the alleged predicate acts, e.g., poor management, the competi-
tive market, pricing strategies, and changing demographics in the dealership's mar-
ket).
116. 931 F. Supp. 543 (W.D. Mich. 1996).
117. See id.; see also Valleyside Dairy Farms, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 944 F.
Supp. 612 (W.D. Mich. 1995) (holding a genuine issue of material fact exists as to
whether defendant's fraudulent misrepresentations regarding Harvestor proxi-
mately caused plaintiffs loss).
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chased a feed storage silo from the defendant."1 8 The defendant al-
legedly fraudulently advertised the silo as oxygen-limiting, but be-
cause of an alleged defect, the silo was not oxygen-limiting. As a re-
suit, feed in the silo purportedly spoiled and caused injury to the•120
dairy herd when the feed was ingested. The plaintiffs sued the de-
fendant under RICO and common law theories, seeking recovery of
damages resulting from depressed milk production, breeding prob-
lems, and a less fit dairy herd."' For purposes of its motion for sum-
mary judgment, the defendant admitted that the plaintiff was harmed
by the allegedly fraudulent statements, i.e., plaintiff would not have
purchased the silo "but for" the allegedly fraudulent statements, and
that the plaintiffs' herd problems would not have resulted "but for"
the use of the silo.1 2 Relying on Holmes, however, the defendant ar-
gued that "but for" causation did not satisfy RICO's proximate cause
standard. Rather, plaintiffs' herd problems were proximately
caused by intervening non-predicate activity, i.e., the alleged manu-
facture of a defective silo and/or other independent factors, such as
weather conditions and/or poor farm management practices. 24 The
only damage that could be directly attributed to the allegedly fraudu-
lent statements was plaintiffs' purchase of the silo, but plaintiffs did
not seek damages related to the difference between the value of the
silo as represented and as it actually performed.15 Thus, the defen-
dant argued that it was entitled to summary judgment on the RICO
claim.
The court, however, denied the defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment. 27 In doing so, the court demonstrated the weakness
of the proximate cause limitation. Despite the Supreme Court's ad-
monition that proximate cause was to be used as a "judicial tool... to
limit a person's responsibility" for a RICO violation, the court saw no
difference between the proximate cause standard applied to RICO
claims versus common law claims:
Proximate causation for purposes of RICO is to be
118. See Martin, 931 F. Supp. at 545.
119. See id. at 545-46.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 546.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 548.
124. See id. at 549.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
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determined with reference to the same principles that ap-
ply to tort claims generally .... If a defendant's conduct
was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs injury, the
defendant will not be absolved from liability merely be-
cause other causes contributed to the injury.... A ques-
tion of fact remains as to whether defendants' admitted
conduct constitutes a proximate cause of injury for which
'justice demands" that they be held accountable."'
Thus, the decision in Martin, unlike the decisions in Holmes, Branden-
burg and First Nationwide Bank, appears to have been the result of the
court's inability to divorce RICO's legal standard of proximate causa-
tion from the long tradition of a factual proximate causation. The
analytical leap that a court must be willing to take when dismissing a
RICO claim on the basis of proximate cause has been aptly described
by the Second Circuit:
[RICO] liability, although discussed under the rubric of
causation, does not turn on the existence of factual, but-
for causation. Nor does it depend on whether there is
proximate cause as that term is used at common law. At
common law, so long as the plaintiff category is foresee-
able, there is no requirement that the risk of injury to the
plaintiff, and the risk of harm that actually occurred, were
what made the defendant's actions wrongful in the first
place. With statutory claims, the issue is, instead, one of
statutory intent: was the plaintiff (even though foreseeably
injured) in the category the statute meant to protect, and
was the harm that occurred (again, even if foreseeable),
the "mischief' the statute sought to avoid. 9
Thus, what many courts may fail to realize is that causation un-
der RICO and other federal statutes first depends upon whether the
type of injury is within the reach of the statute, which is a policy ques-
tion for the court, not an issue of fact for the jury.30 Until the Su-
128. Id. at 348-49 (citing Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d
1386, 1399 (11th Cir. 1994), modified, 30 F.3d 1347 (lth Cir. 1994)); Holmes v.
Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)); see also Kaufman v.
BDO Seidman, 984 F.2d 182, 185 (6th Cir. 1993) (relying on pre-Holmes authority
to support the proposition that RICO's proximate cause standard is the same as
that applied to common law claims).
129. Abrahams v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 79 F.3d 234, 237 (2d Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 66 (1996).
130. Compare Martin v. A. 0. Smith Corp, 931 F. Supp. 543, 548 (W.D. Mich.
1996) (finding that proximate cause in a RICO action is a factual issue as in an or-
dinary tort claim), with Holmes, 503 U.S. at 265-70 (deciding that proximate cause
in RICO actions is a "judicial tool" and is thus a question of law).
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preme Court speaks directly to the significance of non-predicate activ-
ity and independent factors under RICO's proximate cause standard,
the division between those courts willing to dismiss RICO claims on
the basis of proximate causation, and those that are not, will continue
to exist and probably widen.
3. Lack of Reliance
As noted earlier, a conviction under the mail and wire fraud
statutes does not depend on whether anyone was actually de-
frauded. In other words, a person can be convicted of mail or
wire fraud even if no one ever relied on the fraudulent statements.
Under section 1964(c), however, many courts have stated that "reli-
ance is necessary to establish injury to business or property 'by reason
of a predicate act of... [mail or wire] fraud within the meaning of
§ 1964(c)." 32
In the context of product litigation, reliance is always a question
when it comes to claims of false advertising. For instance, a plaintiff
makes an unsolicited purchase of a motor for its factory. Thereafter,
the plaintiff sees advertisements in magazines and on television guar-
131. See United States v. Blumeyer, 114 F.3d 758, 767-68 n.6 (8th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 350 (1997) (following cases not requiring reliance on fraudu-
lent statements).
132. Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1188 n.10 (4th Cir. 1988); see also Chi-
solm v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337-38 (4th Cir. 1996) (reversing dismissal
of plaintiffs' RICO claim and granting plaintiffs leave to amend to plead reliance);
Appletree Square I, Ltd. Partners v. W.R Grace Co., 29 F.3d 1283, 1286 (8th Cir.
1994) (holding a RICO plaintiff must establish detrimental reliance on the defen-
dant's predicate activity); Central Distrib. of Beer, Inc. v. Conn, 5 F.3d 181, 184 (6th
Cir. 1993) (holding a RICO claim is not actionable unless a fraudulent statement was
made to the plaintiff and the plaintiff detrimentally relied on the statement); Caviness
v. Derand Resources Corp., 983 F.2d 1295, 1305 (4th Cir. 1993) (dismissing RICO
claim where there was no evidence that the plaintiffs relied on an allegedly fraudulent
placement memorandum in making their decision to purchase oil and gas wells); Pel-
letier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1509-10 (1 1th Cir. 1991) (concluding plaintiff was not
injured by reason of defendant's mail or wire fraud where he relied only on the com-
pany's sales figures to determine the company's value and did not rely on any of the
allegedly fraudulent information); Grantham & Mann v. American Safety Prods., Inc.,
831 F.2d 596, 606 (6th Cir. 1986) (finding that plaintiff did not rely on fraudulent
assurances that breach would be remedied because he knew that sale territory had
already been offered to and accepted by another); Sperber v. Boesky, 849 F.2d 60, 65
(2d Cir. 1988) (dismissing plaintiffs RICO claim against Ivan Boesky alleging that,
although he never made any fraudulent statements to the plaintiffs, his insider trad-
ing resulted in an increased attraction to certain stocks that caused the plaintiffs to
make losing investments, stating that Boesky was not an insurer for all people who lost
money in the stock market).
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anteeing that the motor will perform without service for 5000 hours.
The plaintiffs motor then breaks down after 2000 hours, causing
production delays at its factory. The plaintiff then calls the motor
manufacturer to complain and speaks to an engineer who innocently
quips that the ads were mere puffery and that no one ever believed
that the motor could perform for 5000 without service. The plaintiff
brings a RICO claim alleging that the advertisements, distributed by
mails and wires, were fraudulent. Because the plaintiff did not rely on
the advertisements, i.e., his purchase of the motor was unsolicited, his
injuries were not caused "by reason of' the pattern of racketeering
activity, and his claim should be dismissed. It should be noted, how-
ever, that some courts disagree with a reliance requirement under
RICO since a mail or wire fraud conviction does not depend upon
detrimental reliance.
133
C. Person / Enterprise Distinction
Section 1962(c) makes it "unlawful for any person employed by
or associated with any enterprise... [to] conduct.., such enter-
prise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.... 1  Ac-
cordingly, courts have long held that a RICO violation must involve
at least two entities: the person and the enterprise with which the
person is associated, i.e., a person cannot associate with himself.
135
This rule was most problematic when it came to pleading RICO vio-
lations against corporations because it prevented plaintiffs from
pleading that a corporate employee (i.e., the person) had associ-
ated with the corporation (i.e., the enterprise) to engage in racket-
eering activity:
Because a corporation can only function through its em-
ployees and agents, any act of the corporation can be
133. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 828 F. Supp. 287,
294-96 (D.N.J. 1993) (explaining that reliance is an element of common law fraud,
not of RICO).
134. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1994) (emphasis added).
135. See Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 30 F.3d
339, 344 (2d Cir. 1994); River City Markets, Inc. v. Fleming Foods West, Inc., 960
F.2d 1458, 1461 (9th Cir. 1992); Schaeffer v. Ascension College, Inc., 964 F. Supp.
1067, 1071 (M.D. La. 1997) (citing In re Bruzynski, 989 F.2d 733, 743 (5th Cir.
1993)); Moore v. Fidelity Fin. Serv., Inc., 949 F. Supp. 673, 678 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(citing Richmond v. Nationwide Cassel L.P., 52 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 1995));
U.S. Concord, Inc. v. Harris Graphics Corp., 757 F. Supp. 1053, 1061 (N.D. Cal.
1991); Garbade v. Great Divide Min. & Mill Corp., 645 F. Supp. 808, 811 (D. Colo.
1986), affd, 831 F.2d 212 (10th Cir. 1987).
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viewed as an act of such an enterprise, and the enterprise
is in reality no more than the defendant itself. Thus,
where employees of a corporation associate together to
commit a pattern of predicate acts in the course of their
employment and on behalf of the corporation, the em-
ployees in association with the corporation do not formS 136
an enterprise distinct from the corporation.
Because they could not satisfy the person / enterprise distinc-
tion by simply accusing corporate employees of committing wrongs
through their corporation, plaintiffs have recently begun to plead
that a corporate parent or subsidiary is the person who associates
with other members of the corporate tree (or the corporation's
dealers, retailers or independent agents) to engage in a pattern of
racketeering activity."' So far, the courts have not been favorable
to this distinction:
[W]e recognize the frequent asymmetry in the legal
treatment of integrated and nonintegrated firms: under
antitrust law, for example, a firm can conspire with its
dealers, but it cannot conspire with its employees. RICO,
however, is not a conspiracy statute. Its draconian penal-
ties are not triggered just by proving conspiracy. "Enter-
prise" connotes more. Just how much more is uncertain;
but it is enough to decide this case that where a large,
reputable manufacturer deals with its dealers and other
agents in the ordinary way, so that their role in the manu-
facturer's illegal acts is entirely incidental, differing not at
all from what it would be if these agents were the employ-
ees of a totally integrated enterprise, the manufacturer
136. Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 30 F.3d 339,
344 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Khurana v. Innovative Health Care Systems, Inc., 130
F.3d 143, 155 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding "when the alleged association in fact is in
reality no different from the association of individuals or entities that constitute a
defendant 'person' and carry out its activities, the distinctiveness requirement is
not met"); China Trust Bank of N.Y. v. Standard Chartered Bank, PLC, 981 F.
Supp. 282, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating "this distinctiveness requirement may not
be circumvented by alleging a conspiracy between the defendant and its own em-
ployees or agents carrying on the regular affairs of the defendant"); Nebraska Sec.
Bank v. Dain Bosworth, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 n.10 (D. Neb. 1993) (assert-
ing "an employee who simply acts within the scope of employment [cannot] be
considered distinct from his or her corporate employer inasmuch as corporations
can only act through their employees") (citing Glessner v. Kenny, 952 F.2d 702,
711-14 (3d Cir. 1991)). But see Old Time Enter., Inc. v. International Coffee Corp.,
862 F.2d 1213, 1217 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that corporate employees and the
corporation were sufficiently distinct).
137. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
19981
33
Grell: Exorcising RICO From Product Litigation
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1998
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
plus its dealers and other agents (or any subset of the
members of the corporate family) do not constitute an en-
terprise within the meaning of the statute. 8
As long as the person / enterprise distinction continues to be
strengthened by similar opinions, product manufacturers have a
valid defense to RICO claims. Manufacturers cannot be held liable
under RICO simply because their employees approved an allegedly
false advertising campaign and the product was sold through a
network of dealers. The employees' approval of the advertising
campaign does not create a distinct person and enterprise because
the employees are merely acting on behalf of the manufacturer.
Similarly, the sale of the manufacturer's product by the dealers
does not satisfy the distinction because the dealers are not substan-
tially different from totally integrated employees. The person / en-
terprise distinction is a limitation that every manufacturer faced
138. Fitzgerald v. Chrysler Corp., 116 F.3d 225, 228 (7th Cir. 1997) (citations
omitted); see also Khurana v. Innovative Health Care Systems, Inc., 130 F.3d 143,
155 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding "the distinctiveness requirement is not satisfied by
pleading a subsidiary corporation or affiliated entity as a perpetrator-defendant if
the parent corporation and the subsidiary's roles in the alleged racketeering activi-
ties are not sufficiently distinct"); Davis v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 6 F.3d 367,
377 (6th Cir. 1993) (noting that "a corporation may not be liable under section
1962(c) for participating in the affairs... of its own subdivisions, agents or mem-
bers."); China Trust Bank of N.Y. v. Standard Chartered Bank, PLC, 981 F. Supp.
282, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding the distinctiveness requirement is not met
where "the alleged conspirators are separate legal entities... operate[d] within
the same corporate structure guided by a single corporate consciousness"); Ewing
v. Midland Fin. Co., No. 96 C222, 1997 WL 627644, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 1997)
(stating that "[m]erely pleading that the parent corporation set the proscribed
policy and that the subsidiary subsequently acted on its behalf is not sufficient" to
satisfy the distinctiveness requirement); Dornberger v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 961 F.
Supp. 506, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (asserting that distinctiveness requirement was sat-
isfied where plaintiff alleged that defendant conducted its scheme through the use
of governmental entities and not through just its agents); Emery v. American Gen.
Fin., Inc., 952 F. Supp. 602, 605-06 (N.D. 11. 1997) (holding "the plaintiff must
allege that the RICO person was doing something more than merely conducting
its own corporate affairs."); R.C.M. Executive Gallery Corp. v. Rols Capital Co., 901
F. Supp. 630, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that distinction requirement is not satis-
fied where plaintiff merely alleged that members of partnership were simply carry-
ing out the business of the partnership); Nebraska Sec. Bank v. Dain Bosworth,
Inc., 838 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (D. Neb. 1993) (asserting that distinction was not
satisfied where plaintiff merely pleaded association between parent and its wholly-
owned subsidiary); Rodriquez v. Banco Cent., 777 F. Supp. 1043, 1054 (D.P.R.
1991), affd, 990 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding "[t]he distinction requirement is
not satisfied by merely naming a corporation and its employees, affiliates, and
agents as an association-in-fact, since a corporation acts through its employees,
subsidiaries and agents, and would thereby be merely associating with itself.").
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with a RICO claim should fully explore.
D. Coordination of Civil and Criminal Remedies
Although untested in the courts, another theory aimed at limit-
ing RICO liability is based on an attempt to coordinate the restitution
remedies available to victims of criminal mail or wire fraud with the
damages recoverable by a civil RICO plaintiff. If a civil plaintiffs
damages were determined under the same standards used to calcu-
late restitution to victims of mail and wire fraud, product manufac-
turers could avoid substantial damage awards under RICO. This the-
ory will not result in dismissal of a RICO claim but may significantly
limit damages.
"A primary rule of statutory construction is that when a court in-
terprets multiple statutes dealing with a related subject or object, the
statutes are in pan materia and must be considered together."3 9 In
other words, a proper comprehensive analysis will read the parts of
the statutory scheme together, bearing in mind the congressional in-
tent underlying the whole scheme.1 4° Thus, because RICO incorpo-
rates the mail and wire fraud statutes, the courts should adopt an in-
terpretation of civil RICO's damage provision that considers the
Congressional intent underlying the whole statutory scheme related
to penalizing violations of the mail and wire fraud statutes.141
Victims of mail and wire fraud, whose claims are prosecuted by
the government, cannot receive restitution for lost profits; yet, this is
frequently a major component of any civil RICO plaintiffs damage1 142 ..
claim. The Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 ("VWPA")
139. Linquist v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 884, 888 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing United States v.
Freeman, 44 U.S. 556, 564-65 (1845)).
140. See id. at 889.
141. Seeid
142. See, e.g., Raybestos Prod. Co. v. Younger, 54 F.3d 1234, 1243-44 (7th Cir.
1995) (holding $240,000 damage award was reasonable where plaintiff alleged $5
million in lost profits); Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1190 (4th Cir. 1988)
(noting the unreasonableness of seeking interest lost on investments as a result of a
state agency's failure to be adequately insured); Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834
F.2d 1297, 1310 (7th Cir. 1987) (asserting damages related to plaintiffs lost rent
were compensable under RICO even though they were not recoverable under
state law contract claim); Frankford Trust Co. v. Advest, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 531,
533-34 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding lost profits are recoverable under RICO); Martin
v. A.O. Smith Corp, 931 F. Supp. 543, 546 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (holding damages
related to lost milk production and lost offspring were barred); Barr Laboratories,
Inc. v. Quantum Pharmics, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 111, 116 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding
plaintiff's damages related to lost drug sales too speculative); Sheperd v. American
Honda Motor Co.,, 822 F. Supp. 625, 630 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (asserting that damages
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governs awards of restitution for all crimes delineated in Title 18 of
the United States Code, including mail fraud and wire fraud. 141 Un-
der the VWPA, victims of Title 18 crimes (i.e., mail or wire fraud) are
entitled to receive a return of the property obtained by the defendant
or its value.'" Victims are not entitled to receive restitution for lost
profits. For example, in United States v. Mitchell,141 the defendant was
convicted of possessing a stolen commercial vehicle that crossed state
lines, a Tide 18 offense.' 46 The district court ordered the defendant
to pay restitution based on the victim's income lost as a result of the
theft. 14 The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's award:
[The VWPA section 3663(b) (1)] sets forth the restitution
that may be ordered for crimes resulting in '... loss... of
property.' This section contains no authority to order res-
titution for lost income.... Congress is clearly capable of
authorizing restitution for lost income when it chooses to
do so. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(b) (2). Despite this fact, it has
not included lost income in the type of restitution that
may be awarded in property cases and, unless and until it
amends the statute to include lost income, courts may not
order such restitution in property cases.148
Given the restitution scheme employed under Title 18, civil
RICO plaintiffs should not be allowed to recover damages related to
lost profits caused by mail or wire fraud. Allowing recovery of lost
profits under RICO for violations of the mail and wire fraud statutes
is illogical and inequitable. Victims whose rights are redressed by
their U.S. Attorney cannot recover any lost profits, whereas victims
who were wealthy enough or sophisticated enough to file a civil RICO
claim, where the burden of proof is less, can recover three times their
lost profits. Such an illogical and inequitable result could not have
related to diminished value of car dealership too "attenuated" from the alleged
wrongful conduct); General Envtl. Science Corp. v. Horsfall, 800 F. Supp. 1497, 1505
(N.D. Ohio 1992), affd in part, rev'd in part, 25 F.3d 1048 (6th Cir. 1994) (awarding
over $1.2 million to plaintiff s in lost profits); Sound Video Unlimited, Inc. v. Video
Shack, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 127, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting plaintiffs lost profits were
recoverable under RICO).
143. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a) (1994). See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 (mail fraud), 1343
(wire fraud) (1994).
144. See id. § 3663(b) (1).
145. 876 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1989).
146. See id. at 1181.
147. See id. at 1182.
148. Id. at 1183; see also United States v. Sharp, 927 F.2d 170, 174 (4th Cir. 1990)
(holding "[b]ased on the plain language of the statute, the district court should not
have included lost income in the calculation of restitution").
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been intended by Congress. The more logical result is that no victim
of wire or mail fraud is entitled to recover lost profits, unless the lost
profits have been diverted away from the plaintiff and to the defen-
dant or a member of the enterprise by virtue of the scheme. 49 This
interpretation effectuates the purposes of RICO, the mail and wire
fraud statutes, and the VWPA, without offending any of the statutes
or Congress' apparent comprehensive scheme. The defendants in a
civil RICO claim will be sufficiently penalized if plaintiffs are allowed
to treble the amount of money actually invested in the scheme.
50
Essentially, this is another policy argument closely related to
RICO's proximate cause standard that may limit a defendant's expo-
sure under RICO. Product manufacturers faced with large lost profit
claims that allegedly arise from a defective and fraudulently adver-
tised product may be aided by this comparison to the restitution
available under the mail and wire fraud statutes.
IV. CONCLUSION
In an order dismissing a RICO claim, the Honorable Judge
Kane of the United States District Court for Colorado best de-
scribed the frustration that RICO has caused many courts and de-
fendants:
RICO is a recurring nightmare for federal courts across
the country. Like the Flying Dutchman, the statute re-
fuses to be put to rest. Beating against the wind, it has jet-
tisoned an effusion of opinions which bobble in its wake.
In a vain attempt to drop anchor in this sea of confusion, I
149. See, e.g., Terminate Control Corp. v. Horowitz, 28 F.3d 1335, 1343 (2d Cir.
1994) (stating plaintiff was entitled to lost profits on contracts it was not awarded
where defendant would only award contracts to other members of the enterprise
who were willing to pay kickbacks to defendant); United States v. Lively, 20 F.3d
193, 202-03 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding defendant who obtained plaintiffs products
through mail order retail catalogue and resold the products to consumers without
ever intending to pay plaintiff for the products was liable for damages, not limited
to the cost of the product because plaintiff could have sold the goods to other
purchasers at retail price); Sound Video Unlimited, Inc. v. Video Shack, Inc., 700
F. Supp. 127, 141-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating plaintiff wholesaler who entered a
joint venture with the defendant distributor whereby plaintiff sold products at a
reduced wholesale cost to defendant so that the joint venture would be more prof-
itable was entitled to the profits it would have made had it sold the goods to de-
fendant at the regular wholesale cost); DeMent v. Abbott Capital Corp., 589 F.
Supp. 1378, 1385-86 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (holding defendants who fraudulently pro-
cured options to purchase stock were partially liable for lost profits under RICO);
150. See Fleischhauer v. Feltner, 879 F.2d 1290, 1299-1300 (6th Cir. 1989) (hold-
ing "[a] plaintiff injured by civil RICO violations deserves a 'complete recovery'").
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have made my position known.' 5'
Product manufacturers are only one group of defendants in whose
nightmares RICO has appeared. Given the breadth of the statute,
no one in modern business can rest assured that he or she will not
be the next to be brought to court under RICO. Product manufac-
turers in particular must be aware that an allegedly fraudulent ad-
vertisement may not only result in a product liability claim but also
in a common law fraud claim, and worse of all, in a RICO claim,
where they may be subject to treble damages. Because the federal
courts have never been unified in their approach to any single as-
pect of RICO, not to mention the entire statute, no one can guar-
antee that any of theories discussed in this article will provide a
product manufacturer with relief from a particular claim, before a
particular judge. To the extent a manufacturer's ounce of preven-
tion fails to protect it from a RICO claim, however, this article and,
in particular those arguments analyzed in section IV, should pro-
vide the manufacturer with some hope for a cure.
151. In re Dow Co. Sarabond Prod. Liab. Litig., 666 F. Supp. 1466, 1470 (D.
Colo. 1987).
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